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Abstract 
 
 
When evaluating new investment projects, oil companies traditionally use the discounted 
cashflow method. This method requires expected cashflows in the numerator and a risk 
adjusted required rate of return in the denominator in order to calculate net present value. The 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) of a project is one of the major cashflows used to calculate net 
present value. Usually the CAPEX is given by a single cost figure, with some indication of its 
probability distribution.  In the oil industry and many other industries, it is a common practice 
to report a CAPEX that is the estimated 50/50 (median) CAPEX instead of the estimated 
expected (expected value) CAPEX.  In this article we demonstrate how the practice of using a 
50/50 (median) CAPEX, when the cost distributions are asymmetric, causes project valuation 
errors and therefore may lead to wrong investment decisions with acceptance of projects that 
have negative net present values. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to McMillan (1992), cost estimation is particularly difficult in the construction 
industry, often leading to considerable cost overruns. The explanations are that there often is 
large uncertainty - often related to new technology - and that the uniqueness of the projects 
limits the learning process. One might expect that cost overruns have the same probability as 
completing the project below the cost estimate. However, observations clearly indicate an 
overrepresentation of cost overruns. This is due to two types of selection bias: 1) project 
selection; it is typically the projects with the most optimistic internal cost estimates that are 
being pursued by the investing firm, and 2) tender selection; competition sees to that tenders 
with pessimistic and realistic cost estimates are ruled out.  
     
A project's capital expenditures (CAPEX) is one of the major cashflows used to calculate net 
present value (along with e.g. operational expenditures (OPEX) and income).  The CAPEX is 
developed through a cost estimate, very often by a company's internal cost estimation 
department.  Usually the CAPEX is given by a single cost estimate, with some indication of 
the probability distribution for this cost estimate. 
 
In this article we demonstrate how the practice of using a 50/50 (median) CAPEX, when the 
cost distributions are asymmetric, causes project valuation errors and therefore may lead to 
wrong decisions with acceptance of projects with negative net present values.  
 
  
2. Case: Estimation Failures in Norwegian Offshore Development Projects 
  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Norwegian petroleum industry experienced a cost level that 
did not justify new offshore development projects. To reduce development time and costs 
drastically on the Norwegian shelf, economic and technical task forces were appointed, with 
members from the oil companies, the suppliers and government. This process, known as 
NORSOK, was inspired by the cost reduction initiative CRINE on the UK shelf. A consensus 
was reached in the Norwegian petroleum industry to implement a number of organisational 
and contractual changes. 
  
Much attention has been devoted to reducing the lead time. Deep water offshore development 
projects are extremely capital intensive, and getting the field on stream at an early stage may 
be decisive for a positive project appraisal (net present value analyses). To reduce the 
development time, contract award (and to some extent fabrication) has started before detailed 
engineering was completed. This has led to a considerable increase in estimation risk. For a 
number of extraction facilities there have been considerable amounts of reengineering and 
refabrication, causing delays and cost overruns. In some cases this has been due to updated 
information about reservoir characteristics and a wish to implement new technology. In other 
cases the initial engineering and planning were simply inadequate. 
  
Previously, oil companies (the licence groups, represented by the operators) coordinated 
deliveries from contractors that were specialised within, respectively, project management, 
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engineering, module fabrication, at-shore/inshore hook-up or marine operations. Today, the 
Norwegian offshore development market is dominated by 3 to 4 major entities marketing 
themselves as capable of carrying out total enterprise contracts and/or projects from concept 
development to offshore installation and start up. Hence, the project management tasks which 
previously had to be carried out by a project team managed by the client, have after 1994 been 
carried out by the major offshore contractors, regulated by EPCI-contracts (Engineering, 
Procurement, Construction, Installation). The large size of the contracts, and the new 
coordination tasks that were to be performed, implied a considerable increase of risk for the 
turnkey suppliers. In the previous fabrication contracts, founded on cost-plus principles, most 
of the risk was borne by the oil companies. In the EPCI-contracts, however, an even split of 
cost overruns and savings, relative to a target sum was introduced. There was an upper limit 
to the cost overruns to be borne by the contractor, but this cap was substantial compared to the 
contractor's financial strength. Thus, in a situation of a considerable increase in risk, a higher 
fraction of the risk is now borne by the contractors. 
 
The performance of the new contractual and organisational solutions in Norwegian offshore 
development projects was evaluated by a government study (Government Report NOU 
1999:11).1 For the new type of development projects, implemented after 1994, the study 
reports aggregate cost overruns exceeding 4 billion dollars. Still, development costs are 
estimated to have fallen; but not to the extent of the over-optimistic expectations. As a result, 
the main contractors have experienced financial problems. Moreover, clients have been forced 
to pay in excess of their contractual obligations in order to secure delivery of the contract 
object when contractor's financial stability is jeopardised. A poor technical definition and a 
resulting under-estimation of scope has also caused schedule delays and subsequent losses to 
the oil companies that they were unable to recover through liquidated damages paid by 
contractors. 
  
Experience gained by the Norwegian oil industry indicates that there should be more focus on 
developing better technical specifications prior to the award of EPCI contracts; planning time 
has been suboptimal. Furthermore, incentive contracts need to be curtailed to the financial 
capacity of the supplier. The choice of design time - which influences the amount of risk - 
must be seen in conjunction with the risk sharing arrangements.2 Also, the need for improved 
cost estimation has been clearly demonstrated. The 50/50 (median) CAPEX cost estimation 
procedure has been - and is -  used by the two major Norwegian oil companies, Statoil and 
Norsk Hydro. It is also this type of cost estimate that all companies on the Norwegian shelf 
are to report to the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy and the Norwegian Oil Directorate.  
  
 
 
3. Probability Distributions of Costs 
 
A cost estimate for a project is a prediction or forecast of the total cost of carrying out the 
project, which can be illustrated by a distribution curve. Illustration A shows a distribution 
that is symmetric from the mode, median, and expected value.   
 
                                                 
1 The cost overruns are also analysed from a contractual and organizational perspective, see Osmundsen (2000). 
2 For a discussion of risk sharing in the petroleum sector, see Osmundsen (1999) and Olsen and Osmundsen 
(2000). 
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Illustration A: CAPEX distribution of a project with symmetric distribution 
 
The P10/90 (P10) project cost value is defined as the cost level with 90% probability of 
overruns, and 10% probabilty to underrun. Conversely, the P90/10 (P90) value is the value 
with 10% probability to overrun, and 90% probability to underrun. The median, also called 
50/50 estimate (P50/50), is the value with equal probability (50 %) that the cost will be higher 
or lower. In a symmetric distribution, the mode, median, and expected values coincide.  This 
is not the case for an asymmetric distribution. 
 
 
Illustration B depicts an asymmetric distribution of project cost, which is positively skewed.   
In such a distribution, the mode, median and expected value are different and, respectively, in 
increasing size (Wonnacott, 1990).   
 
 
 
PROJECT COST
PROBABILITY
BASEESTIMATE
(MODE)
P50/50
(MEDIAN)
EXPECTED
VALUE
P90/10P10/90
 
Illustration B: Project cost estimate with an asymmetric distribution (positively skewed) 
 
The statistical figures of median, mode, and expected value represent a special value in a 
skewed distribution (Wonnacott, 1990; Humphrey, 1991; Austeng and Hugsted, 1993). As 
explained, the median (P 50/50) is the value that has the same probability (50%) of overrun as 
underrun.  In a lottery of all possible project cost values, the mode is the single value that has 
the highest probability to be drawn.  Thus, the modal value is the cost that reflects the top 
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point of the distribution curve.  The expected value - also referred to as a weighted average - 
is the sum of all outcome times the respective probabilities.   
 
Expected value is the anticipated total cost of a project.  Consequently, the expected value 
should be the reported investment cost figure (CAPEX) for a project (Humphrey, 1991; Clark 
and Lorenzoni, 1985).  We add two more remarks that we will come back to:  1) standard 
deviation is measured from the expected value, which statistically makes the expected value 
easier to calculate during the development of the estimate, and 2) income, and other 
costs/expenditures, e.g., OPEX, are reported as expected values and used in net present value 
calculations. For the sake of consistent comparisons, all cash flows including CAPEX should 
be expected values. 
 
 
 
4. The Current Practice and its Problems 
 
In contradiction to the conclusions of the discussion above, the oil industry and many other 
industries adhere to a common practice of reporting a CAPEX that is the estimated 50/50 
(median) instead of the expected value. The 50/50 CAPEX estimate is usually reported 
together with a) the base estimate (which is the sum of all defined cost elements, i.e. sum of 
all cost elements' modal values), and b) the contingency (usually defined as "The amount of 
money in a cost estimate to cover the difference between the 50/50-Estimate and the Base 
Estimate.")  (North Sea, 20013)  
 
In order to illustrate details on problems in cost estimation practice, a reported cost estimate 
for a North Sea Project after a cost risk analysis is shown in Illustration C (North Sea, 2001). 
 
                                                 
3 North Sea (2001), Cost Estimation Procedure and Cost Estimate from a North Sea Project. Oil company that 
prefers to be anonymous, Norway.  The cost reporting practice of any oil company operating in Norwegian 
North Sea sector is similar to this company's practice, due to governmental requirements on reporting of cost 
estimates. 
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Package Cost-item Base Conting. 50/50
Management Topside+bridge 210 6 216
Jacket+piles 15 7 22
OFC Modific. 15 1 16
Topside+bri. Engineering 324 15 339
Equipm. Topside 538 6 544
Equipm. OFC mod. 33 10 43
Bulk 282 18 300
Structure 44 2 46
Onshore fabrication 570 27 597
Jackets+ EPC 190 22 212
Piles Piles 30 3 33
0
Marine Platform inst. 280 12 292
Flotel 78 32 110
Logistics 117 26 143
Marine operat.risk 12 22 34
OFC mod.+ Engineering 52 24 76
Ram416 Materials 25 9 34
Prefabrication 20 4 24
Offshore instum. 98 29 127
Topside HUC 120 16 136
Hidden work 20 20
Misc. Operational cost 48 3 51
Capital spares 60 -10 50
SUM 3181 284 3465  
 
Illustration C: Example of CAPEX estimation from a North Sea Project (all values in million 
Norwegian kroner, MNOK) 
 
Observe that each separate cost item is reported as a base (mode) value, a 50/50 estimate (P50 
or median), and a contingency defined to be the difference between the 50/50 value and the 
base value.  The 50/50 values of each separate cost item is estimated by Monte Carlo 
simulations.  
 
Some of the potential problems (probable errors) observed in the example: 
1. Estimated CAPEX for the total project is reported as a 50/50 estimate, even though 
the distribution is likely to be slightly skewed.  We believe systematically reporting 
50/50 values instead of expected values to be incorrect (a system error in cost 
estimation practice). 
2. The 50/50 values for each cost component are added to generate the total project's 
50/50 value.  We believe that adding 50/50 values for each cost component not 
necessarily gives you the total project 50/50 value. 
 
 
5. The Central Limit Theorem  
 
The cost estimation practice described above may be based on an incorrect interpretation of 
the Central Limit Theorem.  The Central Limit Theorem, first stated by Liapounov in 
1901(DeGroot, 1986), gives us the opportunity under certain conditions to approximate the 
uncertainty distributions of a sum of independent variables by a normal distribution.  Thus, in 
the aggregated normal distribution curve the expected value and the 50/50 (median) value will 
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be the same, as shown in the symmetric curve in Illustration A.  However, this is true only for 
a symmetric curve. 
 
The conditions for the Central Limit Theorem to apply can be summarized in the following 
conditions (Austeng and Hugsted, 1993): 
 
1. The number of the N independent variables are large. 
2. The uncertain variables X1,X2,…,Xn are independent but there are no restriction on the 
type of distribution each uncertain variable may have.    
3. No single variable Xn should dominate the sum 

∑
=
n
i
iX
1
. 
 
We summarize how the uncertainty distribution of a sum of independent variables may be 
approximated by a normal distribution. If the expected value and the variance is expressed as 
E(Xi)= iµ  and Var(Xi)= 
2
iσ for i=1,…,n and 
2/1
1
2
1 1



−
=
∑
∑ ∑
=
= =
n
i
i
n
i
n
i
ii
n
X
Y
σ
µ
  ,     (1) 
then E(Yn)=0 and Var(Yn)=1 . If ( )[ ] ∞<− 3iiXE µ  for i=1,2… and  
 
( )[ ]
0lim
2/3
1
2
1
3
=



−
∑
∑
=
=
∞→ n
i
i
n
i
ii
n
X
σ
µ
 ,      (2) 
 
then, with Yn defined as in (1), for all X,  
 
),()Pr(lim xxYn
n
Φ=≤
∞→
       (3) 
 
where Φ  is the distribution for a standard normal distribution with iµ =0 and 
2
iσ =1.  
In other words, if (2) holds and N is large, the distribution for the sum of independent 
variables 

∑
=
n
i
iX
1
 will be approximately normal with expected value ∑
=
n
i
i
1
µ  and variance 
∑
=
n
I
i
1
2σ . 
 
 
6. Aggregated Cost Estimate Distributions and Positive Skewness 
 
Under the assumption that the three conditions described earlier holds true, the aggregated 
total cost of a project (CAPEX) may be approximated by a normal distribution. The cost 
estimates may then be calculated with the use of the Central Limit Theorem.   
 
However, very few projects have a CAPEX that approximates to a normal or symmetric 
distribution. Most projects have a positively skewed CAPEX distribution, and a majority of 
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the single cost elements that makes up a CAPEX are also positively skewed. Typically, the 
distribution's spread and skewness are also underestimated. Our hyphothesis that most 
projects have a positively skewed CAPEX are above explained by selection biases of projects 
and tenders, and the belief that the three conditions for the Central Limit Theorem to hold 
usually are not met with respect to project cost. Another explanation is the asymmetric nature 
of cost savings and overruns. 
 
If a project is carried out in an ideal manner, the cost would creep down towards an absolute 
project minimum cost that is unique for this project.  However, this minimum cost will have 
an absolute lower limit, that could of course never be below zero. Conversely, if a project is 
poorly carried out, e.g., by refabrication due to insufficient engineering, the cost would 
increase but there would be no absolute upper limit. Cost overruns in the range of 300 per 
cent are not unheard of.   
 
Therefore, the cost for a project has a greater chance of being 50 percent above than estimated 
CAPEX than it does of being 50 percent below.  Humphrey (1991) agrees: " In practice, 
estimates and uncertainties will not follow a normal distribution or even be symmetrical about 
the mean; a cost for a venture has a greater chance of being 50 percent higher than the 
estimated cost than it does for being 50 percent lower."  When we do not have normal 
distributions, the general approach is to employ simulations using the Monte Carlo technique.  
 
 
7. Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
Based on the North Sea Project example, we want to illustrate possible errors of the cost 
estimation practice.   
 
• First, demonstrate that the expected value for the total cost, given each cost element's 
50/50 value from the example project and given an assumed skewed distribution, to be 
different from the reported 50/50 value of MNOK 3465. This would demonstrate that 
these two figures are different and that expected values should be reported. 
• Second, if the total cost estimates uncertainty distribution has a 50/50 value that is 
different from the sum of each cost elements 50/50 value (MNOK 3465), then this 
would demonstrate that the practice of adding several cost elements' 50/50 value does 
not give the 50/50 cost estimate for the total project. 
 
 
Assuming a skewed beta-curve with expected values for each cost element that were 20% 
higher than median value, and a standard deviation of 25% of median, where minimum value 
was one - 1 - standard deviation below median, and maximum value three - 3 - standard 
deviations above median, we undertake Monte Carlo simulation (using @-Risk; Palisade, 
1998).  Illustration D shows the aggregated results from this example.   
 
Exp. value 4158 
50/50 4153 
P10 3806 
P90 4524 
 
Illustration D:  Results from Monte Carlo CAPEX Simulation (uncorrelated, 2000 iterations). 
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First, observe that the expected value is MNOK 4158, i.e. MNOK 693 higher than our 
example project 50/50 value of MNOK 3465.  Second, we observe that the total project 50/50 
value is MNOK 4153, i.e. MNOK 688 higher than our example project 50/50 value MNOK 
3465. 
 
Correlated cost elements 
Since many cost elements are likely to be correlated, we also test the effect of correlations on 
our example distribution by correlating 7 cost elements with a factor of 0,7.  Illustration E 
shows the aggregated results from this example.   
 
Exp. value 4158
50/50 4134
P10 3402
P90 4943
 
Illustration E:  Results from Monte Carlo CAPEX Simulation with correlated cost elements 
(2000 iterations). 
 
Observe that the expected value is the same as in the uncorrelated simulation and that the 
50/50 and mode value have become slightly smaller.  However, the distribution have got a 
larger spread, the P10 (P10/90) and P90 (P90/10) values have moved further away from the 
expected value.  Thus, correlated elements will influence on the spread of the distribution and 
also to some degree on the skewness.  (We also looked at dependency between cost elements 
(one cost element a constant factor of another) and obtained the result that dependency, like 
correlation, increases distribution skewness and standard deviation.   
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We draw two conclusions from this example: 
 
1. Expected value for a skewed uncertainty distribution curve (MNOK 4158) differs 
from the 50/50 estimate given in our project example (MNOK 3465).  The difference 
is MNOK 693, which definitively impact net present value calculations.  In general, 
the 50/50 value is a too low CAPEX estimate, when the cost distribution is positively 
skewed. Thus, the use of 50/50 CAPEX may lead to wrong net present calculations, 
possibly leading to incorrect investment decisions. (The more skewed, the larger the 
difference between the expected value and the 50/50 estimate.) 
2. The total 50/50 value for the skewed distribution curve (MNOK 4153), differs from 
the sum of 50/50 estimate for each cost elements (MNOK 3465).  The difference in 
our example is MNOK 688.  Thus, to aggregate each cost element's median values and 
expect them to be the total project cost median (50/50) value is incorrect.  The more 
skewed the uncertainty distribution of each cost element is, the larger the estimation 
errors. 
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